This paper shows that buildups in firm leverage predict subsequent declines in aggregate regional employment. Using confidential establishment-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau, we exploit variation in regional exposure to leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms, which are widely spread across regions. For a given region, our results show that increases in firms' borrowing are associated with "boom-bust" cycles: employment grows in the short run but declines in the medium run. Across regions, our results imply that regions with larger buildups in firm leverage exhibit stronger short-run growth, but also stronger medium-run declines, in regional employment. We obtain similar results when we condition on national recessions: regions with larger buildups in firm leverage prior to a recession experience larger employment losses during the recession. When comparing regional firm and household leverage growth, we find qualitatively similar patterns for both. Finally, we find that regions whose firm leverage growth comoves more strongly also exhibit stronger comovement in their regional business cycles. * We thank
Introduction
Large U.S. firms are widely spread across regions. During the 1976-2011 period, the average U.S. publicly listed firm owned establishments in 32.3 counties, 19.9 MSAs, and 8.1 states. When these large firms increase their borrowing, regions are differentially impacted. As this paper shows, regions with larger buildups in leverage by U.S. publicly listed firms exhibit stronger aggregate regional employment growth in the short run.
However, this employment growth is only temporary. In the medium run, regions with larger buildups in leverage by U.S. publicly listed firms experience stronger declines in aggregate regional employment. For a given region, this implies that increases in firms' borrowing are associated with "boom-bust" cycles: employment grows in the short run but declines in the medium run. Across regions, our results imply that regions with larger buildups in firm leverage experience stronger short-run growth, but also stronger medium-run declines, in aggregate regional employment.
Our study informs the debate about the role of credit growth. A key finding in that literature is that leverage buildups predict subsequent downturns in economic activity. 1 For example, Schularick and Taylor (2012) find that credit growth is a strong predictor of financial crises; Gourinchas and Obstfeldt (2012) find that increases in the ratio of credit to GDP predict future banking crises; and Baron and Xiong (2017) find that increases in the credit-to-GDP ratio predict bank equity crashes. Notably, Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) find that increases in the ratio of household debt to GDP are associated with "boom-bust" cycles-GDP grows in the short run but declines in the medium run-while increases in the ratio of firm debt to GDP are not associated with "boom-bust" cycles, and they have only weak predictive power in the medium run.
Why would increases in household debt predict future GDP declines but increases in firm debt would not? One possibility is that firms and households both respond to credit booms, which may eventually "go bust." However, firms' credit growth may additionally also respond to other factors, some of which may be positively associated with future output growth. As a result, the overall relation between firms' credit growth and future output growth may be ambiguous. For example, firms may also respond to future growth opportunities-by borrowing and making investments-implying a positive association between firm credit growth and future output growth. Naturally, this raises the question why households do not (also) borrow in response to future growth opportunities. We can think of two possibilities. One is that households are simply not as good at forecasting future growth opportunities. The other is that firms and households are both equally good at forecasting, but households face tighter collateral constraints, preventing them from borrowing against future growth opportunities.
2
In this paper, we explore a U.S. regional setting in which regional variation in firm leverage growth is plausibly uncorrelated with regional growth opportunities. As we will see, when regional growth opportunities are accounted for, we obtain the same pattern for firm leverage growth that prior (country-level) studies have obtained for household leverage growth: buildups in firm leverage are associated with short-run increases but medium-run declines in aggregate regional employment. Thus, buildups in firm leverage are associated with "boom-bust" cycles. Indeed, we obtain the same qualitative pattern for both firm and household leverage growth, which suggests that the predictability of downturns after leverage buildups is a fairly broad phenomenon.
To isolate regional variation in firm leverage growth that is plausibly uncorrelated with regional growth opportunities, we exploit variation in regional exposure to leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms, which are widely spread across U.S. regions.
We measure regional exposure to firms' leverage buildups by computing the weighted average leverage ratio of U.S. publicly listed firms operating in a given region ("regional firm leverage"). Weights are based on firms' regional employment shares. We construct regional employment shares for all U.S. publicly listed firms using data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which provides information on employment, payroll, location, industry, and firm affiliation at the establishment level.
Our main regional analysis is at the county level.
Our identifying assumption is that small non-listed firms in a region are sensitive to regional shocks. We believe this is a sensible assumption. The typical non-listed firm in the LBD is a small local firm operating in a single ZIP code. As prior research has shown, these firms are highly sensitive to local shocks (e.g., Mueller 2017, 2019) . Accordingly, if variation in regional firm leverage growth was correlated with regional growth opportunities, or regional shocks in general, then non-listed firms in the same region should also "respond" to changes in regional firm leverage. However, we find that changes in regional firm leverage are uncorrelated with both employment and wage changes at non-listed firms in the same region. We therefore conclude that variation in regional firm leverage growth in our setting is uncorrelated with regional shocks.
3 By the same token, we also find that changes in regional firm leverage are uncorrelated with changes in regional household leverage ( = 0015). While the former capture the effects of leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms-which are widely spread across U.S. regions-the latter reflect changes in leverage by regional households, which are likely driven by regional factors (e.g., regional house prices).
We find that a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage over a threeyear period is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in regional employment by U.S.
publicly listed firms as well as a 0.5 percent increase in aggregate regional employment (by listed and non-listed firms). In the medium run, however, an increase in regional firm leverage predicts a decline in regional employment. Precisely, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage from  − 3 to  predicts a 3.0 percent decline in regional employment by U.S. publicly listed firms as well as a 0.4 percent decline in aggregate regional employment from  + 1 to  + 4 A comparison of these magnitudes shows that employment changes at U.S. publicly listed firms are passed through to the aggregate regional level at a ratio of approximately 12.8 percent, corresponding to the average regional employment share of U.S. publicly listed firms.
The "non-listed firm placebo" is similar to the "pass-through entity placebo" in empirical studies of corporate tax changes (e.g., Yagan 2015; Giroud and Rauh 2018) . In those studies, pass-through entities (S-corporations, sole proprietorships, partnerships) do not "respond" to corporate (income or dividend) tax changes, implying that variation in the tax changes is plausibly not driven by regional shocks. In all of those cases, increases in leverage by large U.S. publicly listed firms operating in a given region predict subsequent declines in aggregate regional (sectoral) employment.
Lastly, our results do not hinge on how we aggregate at the regional level. Indeed, they come directly from the establishments underlying the aggregation. To illustrate, we consider employment growth at the individual establishment level while saturating our empirical model with highly granular county × industry × year fixed effects. Thus, we compare establishments in the same county, industry, and year-which are exposed to the same regional shocks-belonging to U.S. publicly listed firms with different changes in firm leverage from  − 3 to . We again find that increases in firm leverage predict subsequent declines in employment.
A large body of theory models links increases in leverage to subsequent downturns in economic activity. In these models, buildups in leverage bring about fragility and vulnerability to shocks through balance-sheet constraints (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989 , Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999 , Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014 or belief reversals (e.g., Minsky 1977 , Kindleberger 1978 , Fostel and Geanakoplos 2008 , Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015 , Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2018 . Alternatively, firms may be facing temporary demand or productivity shocks generating mean-reversion in employment growth. We present some evidence that is inconsistent with this alternative story.
First, in case of a temporary employment shock, the subsequent drop in employment is merely a reversal of, and therefore explained by, the initial growth in employment.
However, our results become only slightly weaker-and all coefficients remain similar-if we control for the initial employment growth. Thus, buildups in regional firm leverage with changes in regional employment at non-listed firms. We note that this is not at odds with the agglomeration literature, which documents regional spillovers from large plant openings or other large firm-specific shocks (e.g., Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti 2010; Bernstein et al. 2018 ). In our setting, changes in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms are based on weighted averages across a large number of firms, smoothing out variation at the individual firm level.
have separate predictive power for medium-run declines in aggregate regional employment over and above their possible short-run effects. Second, we find that the predictive power of leverage buildups depends on the initial level of leverage-increases in regional firm leverage are more negatively associated with drops in aggregate regional employment if the initial level of leverage is high. While these results are consistent with the notion that leverage creates fragility and vulnerability to shocks, they are difficult to reconcile with mean-reversion in employment growth.
All our results are unconditional, in the sense that they do not condition on economic downturns. However, our results also hold if we condition on national recessions during our sample period (1980-82, 1990-91, 2001, 2007-09) . In each of these recessions, we find that regions with larger buildups in firm leverage prior to a recession experience larger employment losses during the recession. Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect varies substantially across recessions. For example, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage before a recession is associated with a 0.4 percent decline in aggregate regional employment during the 1980-82 recession but a 1.5 percent decline in aggregate regional employment during the 2007-09 ("Great") recession.
We furthermore examine if comovement in regional firm leverage growth generates comovement in regional business cycles. We find that it does. A one standard deviation increase in the pairwise correlation of regional firm leverage growth is associated with a 1.6
percentage point increase in the pairwise correlation of medium-run regional employment growth. Accordingly, regions whose firm leverage growth comoves more strongly also exhibit stronger comovement in their regional business cycles.
Lastly, we address potential concerns that our results might be picking up effects of household leverage growth. As we mentioned earlier, changes in regional firm and household leverage are uncorrelated in our empirical setting. Not surprisingly, therefore, our estimates remain similar if we control for changes in regional household leverage.
More importantly, we obtain the same qualitative pattern for firm leverage growth and household leverage growth, suggesting that the predictability of downturns after buildups in leverage is a relatively broad phenomenon.
As discussed previously, our paper contributes to a growing literature showing that buildups in leverage predict subsequent downturns in real activity and, more generally, "boom-bust" growth cycles. In a country-level setting, Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) find that this predictive relationship between leverage growth and "boom-bust" cycles only holds for household leverage growth, but not for firm leverage growth. Our paper focuses on a U.S. regional setting. We exploit variation in regional exposure to leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms, allowing us to separate the effects of firm leverage buildups from those of regional growth opportunities, or regional shocks more generally.
Conceptually, our empirical approach is similar to, e.g., Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) , who exploit variation in regional exposure to Chinese import competition; Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) , who exploit regional differences in the sensitivity to national military buildups; and Beraja et al. (2019) , who exploit regional heterogeneity in responses to national interest rate changes. Once we account for regional shocks, we find the same predictive relationship for firm leverage growth that prior country-level literature has obtained for household leverage growth (using the same dynamic regression framework based on three-year changes). Hence, our paper shows that, in contrast to previous findings, buildups in firm leverage do predict subsequent downturns in real activity and, more generally, are associated with "boom-bust" growth cycles.
5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, variables, empirical methodology, and summary statistics. Section 3 studies the relation between regional firm leverage growth and regional employment growth. Section 4 contains various extensions and robustness checks. Section 5 considers mean-reversion in employment growth. Section 6 examines firm leverage buildups prior to national recessions. Section 7 studies regional business cycle comovement. Section 8 compares firm leverage growth and household leverage growth. Section 9 concludes. 5 In line with previous literature (e.g., Schularick and Taylor 2012; Mian, Sufi, and Verner 2017) , which studies leverage buildups at the country level, we take buildups in leverage as given. In practice, firms may increase leverage for many (often firm-specific) reasons, including changes in their cost of capital. Frank and Goyal (2009) provide an empirical assessment of the determinants of firm leverage; Graham and Harvey (2002) present related evidence from CFO surveys; and Graham and Leary (2011) review the empirical literature on firms' capital structure choices. We match individual establishments in the LBD to firms in Compustat using the Compustat-SSEL bridge maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. Given that this bridge ends in 2005, we extend the match to 2011 using employer name and ID number (EIN) by applying the methodology described in McCue (2003) . Following standard practice, we exclude regulated industries (e.g., utilities, financials) as well as firms with missing financial data.
Our main regional analysis is at the county level, though we also conduct analyses at the MSA and state level in robustness checks. We compute county-level employment separately for publicly listed and non-listed firms in a county by adding up employment across individual establishments. To obtain a measure of firm leverage at the county and year level ("regional firm leverage"), we compute the weighted average leverage ratio across all publicly listed firms with establishments in a given county. Weights are based on the firms' county-level employment shares. Our main variable, ∆ Lev(−3 0), is the change in regional firm leverage from  − 3 to  Firm leverage is the ratio of the sum of debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) and long-term debt (item DLTT) to assets (item AT) and is winsorized between zero and one. We proceed analogously when computing firm leverage at the MSA and state level.
We also use data on household debt at the county level from the Consumer Credit Panel provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Household debt is mortgage, credit card, and auto loan debt normalized by adjusted gross income (from IRS data).
Empirical Methodology
We study the dynamic relation between changes in regional firm leverage-the weighted average leverage ratio across all U.S. publicly listed firms with establishments in a given region-and regional employment growth. We estimate the following equation:
where
is the change in firm leverage in county  from  − 3 to ; and   and   are county and year fixed effects. We estimate equation
(1) for all  = −3  2 resulting in six regressions. For example, when  = −3 the coefficient  captures the short-run effects of changes in regional firm leverage from  − 3
to  on regional employment growth from  − 3 to . As  increases, we move towards medium-run effects. For example, when  = 1 the coefficient  captures the effects of changes in regional firm leverage from  − 3 to  on regional employment growth from  + 1 to  + 4. For simplicity, we write ∆ log(Emp)(
etc., in our tables and figures. Observations are weighted by county-level employment.
Standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level.
In one instance, we examine the dynamic relation between changes in firm leverage and employment growth at the individual establishment level. We estimate the following establishment-level analogue of equation (1):
where ∆ log(Emp)  ( +   +  + 3) is the growth in employment at establishment  of firm  in county  and industry As discussed in the introduction, a main concern is that variation in regional firm leverage growth is correlated with regional growth opportunities, or regional shocks in general. While we cannot directly observe regional shocks, we make the (identifying)
assumption that small non-listed firms in a region are sensitive to such shocks. Indeed, the typical non-listed firm in the LBD is a small firm operating in a single ZIP code (see Table 2 ). As prior research has shown, these firms are highly sensitive to regional shocks Mueller 2017, 2019) . Accordingly, if variation in regional firm leverage growth was correlated with regional shocks, then non-listed firms in the same region should also "respond" to changes in regional firm leverage. To see if they do, we estimate equation (1)-which includes county and year fixed effects-using employment growth of non-listed firms as the dependent variable. The results are provided in Table 1 . As is shown in Panel (A), changes in regional firm leverage are uncorrelated with employment changes at non-listed firms in the same region, both in the short run and medium run.
Further, as is shown in Panel (B), changes in regional firm leverage are also uncorrelated with wage changes at non-listed firms, again both in the short run and medium run. We may therefore conclude that variation in regional firm leverage growth in our setting is plausibly uncorrelated with regional growth opportunities, or regional shocks in general. for all firms, publicly listed firms, and non-listed firms. As one would expect, publicly listed firms are much larger than non-listed firms-they have more employees and more establishments. Indeed, the typical non-listed firm is a small firm with (little more than) a single establishment operating in a single ZIP code. In contrast, the typical publicly listed firm owns 85.5 establishments in 63.6 ZIP codes, 32.3 counties, 19.9 MSAs, and 8.1
Summary Statistics
states. The average leverage ratio of publicly listed firms is 0.261. And while there are many ups and downs in firm leverage during the sample period, the average three-year change in firm leverage is close to zero.
Panel (B) provides summary statistics at the county level. The average three-year employment growth at the county level is 5.4 percent for all firms, 4.1 percent for publicly listed firms, and 6.2 percent for non-listed firms. Publicly listed firms account for 12.8 percent of total county-level employment. That said, the county-level employment share of publicly listed firms varies considerably across industry sectors. It is 13.2 percent in the non-tradable sector, 26.9 percent in the tradable sector, and 7.1 percent in the "other"
sector (industries that are neither non-tradable nor tradable). In robustness tests, we perform separate analyses for each industry sector. The average firm leverage ratio at the county level is 0.288, which differs slightly from the corresponding ratio at the firm level due to the uneven geographical distribution of publicly listed firms. The average three-year change in firm leverage at the county level ("regional firm leverage") is again close to zero, and its standard deviation is 0.08.
3 Firm Leverage and Regional Employment Growth shows the growth in aggregate regional employment by all (listed and non-listed) firms in a given region. In both panels, the left plots show the short-run effects of changes in regional firm leverage-the relation between ∆ Lev(−3 0) and ∆ log(Emp)(−3 0)-based on 99,300 county-year observations, while the right plots show the medium-run effects of changes in regional firm leverage-the relation between ∆ Lev(−3 0) and ∆ log(Emp)(1 4)-based on 86,500 county-year observations. For each percentile bin, the plots provide the mean values of ∆ Lev(−3 0) and either ∆ log(Emp)(−3 0) (left plots)
or ∆ log(Emp)(1 4) (right plots).
6 6 All sample sizes are rounded to the nearest hundred following Census Bureau disclosure guidelines.
As the left plot in Panel (A) shows, there is a positive short-run association between changes in regional firm leverage and regional employment growth at U.S. publicly listed firms. The magnitude of this effect is quite large: a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage (0.08) is associated with a 3.5 percent short-run increase in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms (note: 008 × 0440 = 0035). In the medium run, however, this positive association turns negative. As the right plot in Panel (A) shows, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage predicts a 4.3 percent medium-run decline in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms.
The two plots in Panel (B)-which are based on aggregate regional employment by all (listed and non-listed) firms in a given region-look similar to those in Panel (A), except that the magnitudes are much smaller. In the left plot, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage is associated with a 0.8 percent short-run increase in aggregate regional employment, while in the right plot, it is associated with a 0.5 percent medium-run decline in aggregate regional employment. In Section 3.3, we will see that the pass-through from changes in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms to changes in aggregate regional employment is roughly proportional to the average regional employment share of U.S. publicly listed firms. versus 0440, −0526 versus −0541, 0097 versus 0096, and −0069 versus -0064. Three of the four regression coefficients are significant at the one percent level; one is significant at the five percent level. Thus, the bin scatterplots in Figure 1 provide an adequate representation of the raw data. This yields six regressions with dependent variables ranging from short-run ( − 3 to ) to medium-run ( to  + 3   + 2 to  + 5) regional employment growth. Panel (A) examines the relationship between changes in regional firm leverage and regional employment growth at U.S. publicly listed firms. Inspection of all six columns shows that the effects are positive in the short run but negative in the medium run. The sign switches around ( − 2 to  + 1), which is why the coefficient in column (2) is small and insignificant. All other coefficients are significant. In particular, the short-run coefficient in column (1) and the medium-run coefficient in column (5) are both significant at the one percent level. Like in the bin scatterplots in Figure 1 , the magnitudes of the effects are quite large. In column (1), for example, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage is associated with a 3.8 percent short-run increase in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms, whereas in column (5), it predicts a 3.0 percent medium-run decline in regional employment at U.S. publicly listed firms.
Main Results
Employment losses at U.S. publicly listed firms might trigger a drop in regional wages and offsetting hiring by non-listed firms in the same region, with the implication that aggregate regional employment remains unchanged. That being said, we have already seen that changes in regional firm leverage are uncorrelated with both employment and wage changes at non-listed firms in the same region. Hence, we would expect that employment changes at U.S. publicly listed firms are passed through to the aggregate regional level without any significant offsetting effects.
Panel (B) examines the relationship between changes in regional firm leverage and aggregate regional employment growth-the growth in total employment by all (listed and non-listed) firms in a given region. As can be seen, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Panel (A). The short-run effects are again positive, the sign switches again around ( − 2 to  + 1), and the medium-run effects are again negative. Also, the short-run coefficient in column (1) and the medium-run coefficient in column (5) Table 3 ).
Inspection of all three panels shows that the results are qualitatively similar across industry sectors. To interpret the coefficients, note that the standard deviation associated with ∆ Lev(−3 0) is 0.108 for tradable industries, 0.086 for non-tradable industries, and 0.091 for other industries. In column (2), for example, where the dependent variable is ∆ log(Emp)(1 4), a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage predicts a subsequent decline in aggregate regional employment of 0.4 percent both in the tradable and non-tradable sector and 0.6 percent in the "other" sector. We may thus conclude that the medium-run effects of changes in regional firm leverage on aggregate regional (sectoral) employment are fairly similar across industry sectors.
MSAs and States
Using counties as our unit of analysis entails two main advantages. First, our sample consists of nearly 100,000 county-year observations, allowing us to precisely estimate all coefficients. Second, with over 3,000 counties, there is ample regional variation in both regional firm leverage growth and aggregate regional employment growth.
In Table 5 , we estimate equation (1) In column (2), for example, where the dependent variable is ∆ log(Emp)(1 4), a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage predicts a subsequent decline in aggregate regional employment of 0.4 percent at the MSA level and 0.8 percent at the state level, which is of the same order of magnitude as the corresponding drop at the county level. Hence, our results are robust to using broader definitions of regions.
4.3 Computing ∆ Lev(−3 0)
As described in Section 2.1, we compute changes in regional firm leverage, ∆ Lev(−3 0), in two steps. We first obtain a measure of regional firm leverage at the county and year level by computing the weighted average leverage ratio in a given year across all publicly listed firms with establishments in the county. Weights are based on firms' county-level employment shares. In a second step, we compute the change in this measure over a three-year period from  − 3 to  Alternatively, we can compute changes in regional firm leverage over a three-year period from changes in firms' leverage ratios. Precisely, we compute the change in firm leverage from  − 3 to  for all publicly listed firms with establishments in the county.
In a second step, we construct ∆ Lev(−3 0) by computing the weighted average of these firm-level changes using the firms' county-level employment shares in  − 3 as weights.
As is shown in Table A .3 of the Online Appendix, it makes ultimately little difference how we compute ∆ Lev(−3 0): all coefficients are very close to the original coefficients in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 (−0038 versus −0035, −0057 versus −0053, −0044
versus −0046) and their standard errors are identical.
Firms with Distant Headquarters
Regional shocks may disproportionately affect firms headquartered in the region. 7 In Table A .2 of the Online Appendix, we exclusively focus on firms with distant headquarters.
Specifically, when computing our measure of regional firm leverage based on U.S. publicly listed firms, we drop firms which are either headquartered in the region or nearby. In
Panel (A), we require that firms' headquarters be located at least 1,000 miles away from the given region. In Panel (B), we require that firms' headquarters be located in a different state. As can be seen, all our results remain similar.
Establishment-Level Evidence
Our results do not depend on how we aggregate at the regional level. Indeed, they come directly from the individual establishments underlying the aggregation. To illustrate, we consider employment growth at the individual establishment level. A benefit of using establishments as our unit of analysis is that we can saturate our model with highly granular fixed effects. Precisely, we estimate equation (2), which is similar to equation (1), except that it includes county × industry × year fixed effects, while employment and firm leverage growth are measured at the establishment and firm level, respectively. Industries are measured at the 4-digit NAICS code level. Accordingly, we compare establishments in the same county, industry, and year-which are likely exposed to the same regional shocks-that belong to U.S. publicly listed firms with different changes in firm leverage from  − 3 to . Table 6 shows the results. As can be seen, buildups in firm leverage predict subsequent declines in establishment-level employment, consistent with what we found at the aggregate regional level.
Mean-Reverting Employment Growth
A large body of theory models links buildups in leverage to subsequent downturns in economic activity. In models based on financial frictions, increases in leverage bring about fragility and vulnerability to shocks operating through balance-sheet constraints (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989 , Kiyotaki and Moore 1997 , Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999 , Brunnermeier and Sannikov 2014 . In behavioral models, optimism leads to credit expansions, financial fragility, and belief reversals, resulting in slowdowns in economic growth (e.g., Minsky 1977 , Kindleberger 1978 , Fostel and Geanakoplos 2008 , Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny 2015 , Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2018 ).
An alternative story is that firms may be facing temporary demand or productivity shocks generating mean-reversion in employment growth. For example, firms facing an increase in demand may hire more workers. When the demand subsides, the workers are laid off. If the initial expansion is funded with debt, we might see an increase and subsequent drop in employment, where the initial employment growth is accompanied by an increase in leverage. And yet, the drop in employment is fully explained by the initial increase-the increase in leverage is just a "side show." In Table 7 , we provide some evidence that is inconsistent with this alternative story.
First, in case of a temporary shock, the subsequent drop in employment is a reversal of, and thus explained by, the initial growth in employment. However, Panel (A) shows that our main results become only slightly weaker if we control for the initial employment growth. Indeed, the coefficients in columns (1) to (3) are very close to the original coefficients in Table 3 (−0030 versus −0035, −0049 versus −0053, −0042 versus −0046), and their significance is only slightly reduced (−values of 0076 versus 0049, 0003 versus 0002, 0013 versus 0007). Accordingly, buildups in regional firm leverage have separate predictive power for medium-run declines in aggregate regional employment over and above their possible short-run effects.
Second, under the employment mean-reversion story, buildups in leverage are just a "side show." Consequently, their ability to predict subsequent employment drops should not vary with measures of fragility, such as the level of leverage. In contrast, under the fragility story, we would expect that a given increase in leverage has a stronger effect on future employment growth when the initial level of leverage is high. In Panel (B), we interact ∆ Lev(−3 0) with dummies indicating whether the initial level of regional firm leverage in  − 3 lies in the first, second, or third tercile of its sample distribution (based on all county-year observations). As is shown, the effect of leverage buildups on future employment growth is highly non-linear. When the initial level of regional firm leverage is low, increases in leverage have no significant effect. At intermediate levels, there is a significant effect in column (2) but not in columns (1) or (3). Finally, at high levels of leverage, increases in regional firm leverage have a strongly negative effect on future employment growth in all three columns. Thus, buildups in leverage matter precisely when the regional economy is fragile to begin with. While the results shown in Table 7 are consistent with the notion that leverage creates fragility and vulnerability to shocks, they are difficult to reconcile with mean-reversion in employment growth.
National Recessions
All our results so far have been unconditional, in the sense that they do not condition on economic downturns. Rather, they predict downturns in regional economic activity following increases in regional firm leverage. Note that increases in regional firm leverage firm leverage is similar to the average sample effect in Table 3 . In both recessions, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage prior to the recession is associated with a 0.4 percent decline in aggregate regional employment during the recession. In the 1990-1991 recession, the effect of a buildup in firm leverage is much stronger. In that recession, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage before the recession is associated with a subsequent drop in aggregate regional employment of 1.1 percent.
Finally, the effect of a buildup in firm leverage is strongest in the 2007 -2009 recession, where a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage prior to the recession is associated with a 1.5 percent reduction in aggregate regional employment during the recession. 10 Accordingly, the effect of firm leverage buildups prior to national recessions varies considerably from recession to recession.
Business Cycle Comovement
Do regions whose firm leverage growth comoves more also exhibit greater comovement in their business cycles? To address this question, we compute for all (circa five million) region-pairs the pairwise correlation of i) regional firm leverage growth, [∆ Lev(−3 0)]
and ii) regional employment growth, [∆ log(Emp)(1 4)]. We then regress the pairwise correlation of regional employment growth on the pairwise correlation of regional firm leverage growth while including county fixed effects. Although this is a cross-sectional regression, we note that each region appears  − 1 times in the sample-the number of pairwise correlations it shares with other regions. Consequently, we are able to absorb region-specific variation by including county fixed effects. Table 9 shows the results. As can be seen, the relation between [∆ Lev(−3 0)]
and [∆ log(Emp)(1 4)] is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level.
Hence, if region 's firm leverage growth comoves more strongly with region 's firm leverage growth than with region 's, then region 's employment growth also comoves more strongly with region 's employment growth than with region 's. To interpret the magnitude of this effect, note that the standard deviation associated with [∆ Lev(−3 0)] is 0.323. Accordingly, a one standard deviation increase in the pairwise correlation of regional firm leverage growth is associated with a 1.6 percentage point increase in the pairwise correlation of medium-run regional employment growth.
Firm versus Household Leverage
We finally address possible concerns that our results could be picking up the effects of changes in regional household leverage. A priori, this seems unlikely. While changes in (our measure of) regional firm leverage capture the effects of leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms-which are widely spread across U.S. regions-changes in regional household leverage reflect choices made by regional households, which are likely driven by regional factors (e.g., house prices). Indeed, the correlation between changes in regional firm and household leverage is close to zero ( = 0015).
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In Table 10 , we include changes in regional household leverage, ∆ HH Lev(−3 0), in our regression. Panel (A) considers our main panel specification, except that the sample period is from 1999 to 2011. As can be seen, we obtain the same qualitative pattern for regional firm and household leverage. In either case, a buildup in leverage predicts a subsequent downturn in economic activity. To interpret the coefficients, note that the standard deviations associated with ∆ Lev(−3 0) and ∆ HH Lev(−3 0) are 0.069 and 0.421, respectively. In column (2), for example, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage predicts a subsequent decline in aggregate regional employment of 0.5 percent, which is almost identical to our estimate in Table 3 . Also, a one standard deviation increase in regional household leverage predicts a subsequent drop in aggregate regional employment of 1.6 percent, which is of similar magnitude as the 2.1 percent drop in GDP growth in Mian, Sufi, and Verner (2017) , despite differences in samples and variable definitions. Altogether, these results suggest that the predictability of downturns after buildups in leverage is a relatively broad phenomenon. Table 8 , which focuses on the Great Recession. As can be seen, we again obtain the same pattern for regional firm and household leverage. To interpret the magnitudes, we note that the standard deviations associated with ∆ Lev(−3 0) and ∆ HH Lev(−3 0) are 0.105 and 0.572, respectively.
Panel (B) considers the specification from Panel (D) of
In column (2), for example, a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage prior to the Great Recession is associated with a 1.3 percent decline in aggregate regional employment during the Great Recession. The economic magnitude of an increase in regional household leverage is, in fact, identical. Hence, regions with larger buildups in either firm or household leverage prior to the Great Recession exhibit larger declines in aggregate regional employment during the Great Recession.
Conclusion
Our paper contributes to a growing literature showing that buildups in leverage predict downturns in economic activity (e.g., Schularick and Taylor 2012; Mian, Sufi, and Verner 2017) . Our empirical approach differs from prior studies in that we exploit regional variation in leverage buildups by large U.S. publicly listed firms, allowing us to separate the effects of leverage buildups from regional growth opportunities, or regional shocks more generally. We find that a one standard deviation increase in regional firm leverage-the weighted average leverage ratio of U.S. publicly listed firms operating in a given regionpredicts a subsequent drop in aggregate regional employment of 0.4 percent. For a given region, our results show that increases in firms' borrowing are associated with "boombust" cycles: employment grows in the short run but declines in the medium run. Across different regions, our results imply that regions with larger buildups in firm leverage exhibit stronger short-run growth, but also stronger medium-run declines, in aggregate regional employment. Altogether, our results suggest that the geography of U.S. publicly listed firms' operations plays an important role for regional employment growth cycles.
Our results have policy implications. Prior studies have shown that fiscal or monetary policy shocks differentially impact U.S. regions-because regions are differentially exposed to military buildups (Nakamura and Steinsson 2014) or home-equity based borrowing (Beraja et al. 2019) . Our study suggests that fiscal or monetary policy shocks affecting the borrowing decisions of large U.S. publicly listed firms differentially impact U.S. regionsbecause regions are differentially exposed to those firms.
Figure 1 Bin Scatterplots
This figure shows bin scatterplots depicting the relation between changes in regional firm leverage and either regional employment growth at U.S. publicly listed firms (Panel (A)) or aggregate regional employment growth (Panel (B) ). In both panels, the left scatterplots depict the (short-run) relation between Δ Lev(-3,0) and Δ log(Emp)(-3,0) based on 99,300 county-year observations, while the right scatterplots depict the (medium-run) relation between Δ Lev(-3,0) and Δ log(Emp)(1,4) based on 86,500 county-year observations. For each percentile bin, the scatterplots provide the mean values of Δ Lev(-3,0) and either Δ log(Emp)(-3,0) (left scatterplots) or Δ log(Emp)(1,4) (right scatterplots).
Panel (A): Regional employment growth at publicly listed firms Panel (B): Aggregate regional employment growth Table 1 "Non-Listed Firm Placebo"
In Panel (A), the dependent variable is employment growth by non-listed firms at the county level. In Panel (B), the dependent variable is wage growth by non-listed firms at the county level. Growth rates are measured over three years from t + τ to t + τ + 3, where τ ranges from τ = -3 in column (1) to τ = 2 in column (6). Δ Lev (-3,0) is the change in regional firm leverage from t -3 to t as described in Section 2.1. Observations are weighted by countylevel employment. Standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level. The sample period is from 1976 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Panel (A): Regional employment growth at non-listed firms Panel (B): Regional wage growth at non-listed firms Panel (A) provides firm-level summary statistics for all firms (column (1)), publicly listed firms (column (2)), and non-listed firms (column (3)). # ZIP codes is the number of ZIP codes in which the firm has establishments. # Counties, # MSAs, and # States are defined analogously. Leverage at the firm level is the ratio of the sum of debt in current liabilities (Compustat item DLC) and long-term debt (item DLTT) to total assets (item AT). Δ Lev is the change in firm leverage from t -3 to t. Panel (B) provides county-level summary statistics for all firms (column (1)), publicly listed firms (column (2)), and non-listed firms (column (3)). Δ log(Emp) is the growth in county-level employment from t -3 to t. Employment share is the total county-level employment share of either publicly listed firms (column (2)) or non-listed firms (column (3)). Employment share (non-tradable), employment share (tradable), and employment share (other) are defined analogously. Leverage is regional firm leverage at the county and year level as described in Section 2.1. Δ Lev is the change in regional firm leverage from t -3 to t. Table 3 in which Δ log(Emp)(-3,0) is included as a control variable. Panel (B) presents variants of the regressions in columns (4) to (6) of Panel (B) of Table 3 in which Δ Lev(-3,0) is interacted with dummies indicating whether the initial level of regional firm leverage in t -3 lies in the first, second, or third tercile of its sample distribution based on all county-year observations. Observations are weighted by county-level employment. Standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level. The sample period is from 1976 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Panel (A): Controlling for initial employment growth Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) (0,3)
(1,4) (2,5) Table 3 in which the dependent variable is either one-year (column (1)), two-year (column (2)), or three-year (column (3)) growth in aggregate regional employment. Year "0" indicates the year immediately before a national recession. For example, in Panel (A), Δ Lev(-3,0) is the change in regional firm leverage from 1976 to 1979, while Δ log(Emp)(1,2), Δ log(Emp)(1,3), and Δ log(Emp)(1,4) represent the growth in aggregate regional employment from 1980 to 1981, 1980 to 1982, and 1980 to 1983, respectively . For brevity, the table only displays the coefficients and standard errors associated with Δ Lev (-3,0) . Observations are weighted by county-level employment. Standard errors are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) (1,2) (1,3) (1,4)
(1) (2) (1,4) ], is the pairwise correlation of (medium-run) aggregate regional employment growth between two counties. ρ 0) ] is the pairwise correlation of regional firm leverage growth between two counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county level. The sample period is from 1976 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. (B) ) in which the change in regional household leverage, Δ HH Lev (-3,0) , is included as a control variable. Regional household leverage is the ratio of household debt (mortgage, credit card, and auto loan debt) to income at the county level. Observations are weighted by county-level employment. In Panel (A), standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level. In Panel (B), standard errors are robust standard errors. In Panel (A), the sample period is from 1999 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Panel (A): Panel specification (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) (0,3)
(1,4) (2,5) Table 4 in which regional firm leverage is based on firms whose headquarters are located at least 1,000 miles away from the given region (Panel (A)) or in a different state (Panel (B) ). Observations are weighted by county-level employment. Standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level. The sample period is from 1976 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 4 in which Δ Lev(-3,0) is computed as the weighted average change in firm leverage from t -3 to t across all publicly listed firms with establishments in a given county using as weights the firms' county-level employment shares in t -3. Observations are weighted by county-level employment. Standard errors are double clustered at the county and year level. The sample period is from 1976 to 2011. *, **, and *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) Δ log(Emp) (0,3)
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